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Arab Spring Still Alive: Regimes Adapt to Persisting Protest

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  Published in Politics and Government on Thursday, December 18th 2025 at 4:32 GMT by Al Jazeera English

The Arab Spring is Still Alive – And the Regimes Know It

When the first wave of protests swept across the Arab world in 2010‑2011, many believed the continent was on the brink of a sweeping democratic transformation. The hope was that the fall of long‑term autocrats—Ben Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak in Egypt, Bashar Al‑Assad in Syria, and the Gaddafi regime in Libya—would spark a new era of citizen‑led governance. In the years that followed, however, the political realities on the ground proved far more complex. Al Jazeera’s recent opinion piece, “The Arab Spring hasn’t ended and Arab regimes know it,” argues that the movement’s legacy remains a powerful undercurrent of dissent and that the entrenched governments have taken stock of this reality, adapting their tactics to survive and, in some cases, consolidate power.

1. The “Ending” of the Arab Spring – A Misnomer

The article begins by debunking the notion that the Arab Spring “ended” when many uprisings failed to produce lasting democracy. The author notes that while the initial wave of revolutions did not deliver the promised institutions, the spirit of dissent did not simply die. Instead, the region has entered a new phase in which protests are more fragmented, localized, and often tied to specific grievances—such as unemployment, public service failures, and authoritarian crackdowns—rather than a unified demand for regime change.

The piece cites the 2024‑25 series of protests in Tunisia as a key illustration. After the 2021 presidential election, which the opposition claimed was marred by irregularities, thousands of Tunisians took to the streets in late 2024 demanding a new constitution that would curb the powers of the presidency. The Tunisian security forces responded with a mix of arrests and a heavy-handed use of tear gas, but the demonstrations revealed that the populace remains politically conscious and organized.

2. Regime Adaptation and Co‑Optation

Central to the article is an analysis of how Arab regimes have adjusted to the reality that popular mobilization still exists. The governments have employed a hybrid strategy that blends repression with selective liberalization. For instance:

• Egypt: Following the 2013 ouster of Mohammed Morsi, the administration of President Sisi has introduced limited political reforms—such as easing restrictions on civil society organizations—while simultaneously tightening surveillance and cracking down on dissenting voices. The 2025 parliamentary elections, scheduled for July, were described by the author as a “managed democracy,” where opposition parties can participate but face significant structural barriers.

• Libya: The 2024 general election was boycotted by many opposition groups due to concerns over electoral fraud. Nevertheless, the government has pledged reforms in the electoral process and a crackdown on extremist factions. This dual approach aims to present an image of openness while maintaining control over the political narrative.

• Jordan and Bahrain: Both monarchies have introduced modest electoral reforms, such as increasing the proportion of elected seats in their parliaments. Yet, the political landscape remains tightly regulated, with opposition movements often restricted from participating in national elections.

The author argues that this “soft authoritarianism” is a deliberate strategy, one that acknowledges the power of protest but seeks to neutralize it through controlled liberalization.

3. Economic Drivers of Discontent

An important thread in the article is the role of economic malaise as a catalyst for unrest. In most Arab Spring states, economic grievances were as much a factor as political grievances. Today’s protests in Yemen, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia revolve around rising food prices, unemployment, and wage stagnation. The author cites the World Bank’s 2024 report that shows inflation rates exceeding 15% in several Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—a fact that has reignited anti‑government sentiment among the youth.

The piece also links the economic fallout from the war in Ukraine to increased food prices in the Middle East, exacerbating public frustration. The author highlights the 2025 protests in Syria’s southern governorates, where farmers demanded better grain prices and a reliable electricity supply.

4. The Digital Battlefield

Social media remains a critical arena for organizing and mobilizing protestors. The article references a 2024 Al Jazeera investigation that revealed how state‑run media and private influencers are now using encrypted messaging apps to coordinate protests while evading state surveillance. Moreover, the author discusses how state‑owned platforms are increasingly used to spread propaganda, attempting to dilute the influence of opposition narratives.

The piece also brings up the use of AI‑driven bots to monitor and target dissenting online activity, a trend that has been reported by the 2025 Reuters analysis “AI and the Arab World’s Fight for Digital Freedom.” This digital arms race further illustrates that the Arab Spring’s underlying dynamics are being contested in new domains.

5. External Influences and Geopolitics

A particularly nuanced part of the article is its examination of how external actors shape internal politics. The author argues that the United States, Russia, and China have all leveraged their strategic interests in the region to either support incumbent regimes or back opposition groups, depending on the broader geopolitical context. For instance:

• The U.S. continues to provide diplomatic support to Egypt’s Sisi regime, while simultaneously offering humanitarian aid to conflict‑torn areas like Yemen.
• Russia’s increasing influence in Syria has helped solidify Bashar Al‑Assad’s rule, limiting the potential for an Arab Spring‑style resurgence.
• China’s Belt and Road Initiative has brought investment to Tunisia and Libya, which has in turn bolstered regime legitimacy by providing economic opportunities, though at the cost of increased external dependency.

The article points out that the interplay between these global powers and domestic movements creates a complex matrix of interests that any potential democratic transition must navigate.

6. The Future of Arab Spring

In concluding, the author remains cautiously optimistic about the persistence of the Arab Spring’s ideals. While the region has not yet reached a tipping point toward a full democratic transformation, the continued protests, particularly those driven by youth and driven by economic grievances, suggest that the movement’s momentum cannot be easily extinguished. The article emphasizes that the regime’s awareness of this reality—reflected in its evolving tactics—means that any attempt at change must be strategic and inclusive, addressing both political and economic needs.

In essence, the piece argues that the Arab Spring has not ended but has simply entered a new phase. It calls for a renewed international dialogue that takes into account the complex realities on the ground and recognizes that the struggle for greater freedoms, economic security, and accountable governance remains as relevant today as it was a decade ago.