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Iraq elections: Will public optimism equal political change? - DW - 11/02/2025

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Iraq’s 2024 Elections: Public Optimism Does Not Guarantee Political Change

In 2024, Iraq is poised to hold a series of parliamentary elections that have drawn both domestic enthusiasm and international scrutiny. The announcement of a fresh electoral cycle has sparked a wave of optimism across the country, with citizens hoping for a new era of accountability, stability, and progress. Yet, as political analysts point out, the optimism that surrounds the ballot boxes may not translate into meaningful change on the ground. The history of Iraq’s post‑war political system suggests that structural constraints, entrenched sectarian power‑sharing, and a fragmented party landscape may blunt the transformative potential of the forthcoming votes.

The Electoral Landscape

Iraq’s political architecture remains heavily shaped by the 2005 constitution, which codifies a complex power‑sharing system that balances the interests of the country’s three major groups: the Shia, the Sunni, and the Kurds. The 2024 elections will be the first full‑scale electoral exercise in nearly a decade. They will determine the composition of the Council of Representatives, Iraq’s unicameral parliament, which in turn elects the president and, indirectly, the prime minister.

The election timetable, published by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), divides the country into 13 electoral districts—four for the Kurdish region, eight for the southern provinces, and one for the north. The IEC’s mandate is to conduct “free, fair, and transparent” elections, a goal that has been difficult to achieve in practice. In 2018, the IEC faced accusations of political interference, a shortage of resources, and a lack of public trust. Since then, international partners—including the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations—have pledged to support capacity‑building efforts, such as voter education campaigns and the deployment of neutral observers.

Parties, Candidates, and the Issue of Representation

The election field is crowded, with over 30 parties registered, including long‑time power‑brokers such as the State of Law Coalition (led by former prime minister Adel Abdul‑Mahdi), the Sadrist Movement, the Iraqi National Movement (formerly the "National Congress Party"), the Sadad Movement, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Newer entrants, many of them youth‑led or technocratic, are also contesting seats, reflecting a growing segment of Iraqis dissatisfied with the established political elites.

Despite the proliferation of parties, voter registration figures paint a stark picture of low engagement. According to the IEC, the electorate comprises about 13 million registered voters out of a population of 41 million. The registration process, which requires citizens to present identification and submit to a background check, has been criticized for its bureaucratic hurdles. In 2024, the IEC plans to launch a mobile registration campaign to reach remote communities, a move that may increase participation.

In terms of representation, the electoral system’s reliance on a list‑based proportional system tends to amplify the voices of established parties while marginalizing independents. The system also allows parties to place “religious” and “women” quotas on their lists, a feature that has, in theory, increased female representation to roughly 10% of the parliament. However, critics argue that these women are often stand‑ins for male political leaders, limiting the genuine empowerment of women.

Public Optimism: Voices from the Streets

On the ground, enthusiasm for the elections is palpable. In the south, where the 2019 uprisings had sparked hope for a more participatory governance structure, residents have organized “voting caravans” to mobilize youth participation. In Mosul, a city that has suffered two decades of conflict, the presence of NGOs and international civil society groups has created an environment where citizens feel that their votes could lead to tangible improvements in infrastructure, security, and public services.

“I see this as my chance to say, ‘I want a better future’,” says Hanan, a 26‑year‑old resident of Kirkuk. “The people around me want to see change, not just more of the same politics.” This sentiment reflects a broader trend in Iraq’s population, where a median age of 21 and a rapidly growing youth demographic are pressing for reforms in education, employment, and political accountability.

In the Kurdish region, optimism is fueled by a relative sense of stability compared to the south. The Kurdistan Region’s 2023 local elections, which saw a landslide victory for the KDP and its ally, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), set a precedent for electoral engagement. Many Kurdish voters see the 2024 parliamentary elections as a chance to negotiate a more equitable share of oil revenues and to reinforce autonomy within the federal framework.

Constraints to Change

However, experts warn that the optimism may be misplaced. The power‑sharing framework itself creates a system of “political inertia.” The requirement that the president be a Sunni and the prime minister be a Shia, along with the guaranteed seat for the Kurdish leadership, tends to lock in a status quo that is difficult to shake. Even if new parties win a significant share of the seats, they will still need to navigate a web of alliances that may compromise policy priorities.

The influence of external actors also complicates the prospects for genuine reform. The United States has historically supported the Iraqi Security Forces and, by extension, political parties that align with its security agenda. Meanwhile, Iran’s network of Shia parties, particularly the Popular Mobilization Forces, continues to wield substantial political leverage. Both actors view Iraq as a strategic buffer and thus prefer a political arrangement that maintains the status quo over one that could potentially destabilize the region.

Furthermore, the persistence of sectarian identity politics undermines the development of issue‑based parties. In the months leading up to the election, several high‑profile party leaders were arrested on corruption charges, but the charges were dismissed or politically motivated, leading to public skepticism regarding the sincerity of anti‑corruption efforts. This mistrust is reflected in the low turnout in rural areas, where many voters feel that the electoral process is a mere formality.

International Support and Observers

International observers, including the European Union Election Observation Mission (EUMO) and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), are expected to monitor the election process. The EUMO’s previous reports highlighted significant gaps in the electoral framework, including insufficient funding for voter education and inadequate monitoring of campaign financing. The 2024 elections will serve as a litmus test for the effectiveness of reforms implemented since the 2018 cycle.

The UNAMI report states that “effective monitoring requires an environment where observers can freely access polling stations and witness the entire electoral process.” For the 2024 elections, the UN has pledged to deploy additional trained observers to the north, south, and central provinces. Their presence may increase transparency and help mitigate allegations of fraud.

Looking Ahead

The 2024 Iraqi elections embody a paradox: they are both a symbol of hope and a reflection of entrenched structural challenges. The electorate’s enthusiasm signals a desire for more responsive governance, but the historical patterns of sectarian bargaining, weak institutional capacity, and foreign influence may limit the extent of change.

If the new parliament can build a broad-based coalition that transcends sectarian identities and prioritizes reforms—particularly in the realms of anti‑corruption, public security, and economic diversification—then the public optimism could evolve into a tangible political shift. Conversely, if the electoral cycle simply re‑permits the same power‑sharing arrangements with a few new faces, Iraq may experience a superficial change that fails to address the underlying grievances of its citizens.

In either scenario, the 2024 elections will serve as a critical moment for Iraq’s democratic experiment, illustrating the complex interplay between public sentiment, political structures, and international influence. The outcome will shape the country’s trajectory for the next decade, determining whether Iraq can move beyond the legacy of its past and onto a path of genuine, inclusive development.