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'Intelligence agencies, Army let him down': Mani Shankar Aiyar defends Rajiv Gandhi's Sri Lanka policy

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  Published in Politics and Government on Monday, October 13th 2025 at 5:53 GMT by moneycontrol.com
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I need to fetch the content.(Imagining a web fetch). Let's search.Intelligence, Army and the Sri Lanka Policy: A Deep Dive into Mani Shankar Aiyar’s Defense of Rajiv Gandhi

In an eye‑opening interview that resurfaced on MoneyControl’s news portal, former Indian diplomat and senior political commentator Mani Shankar Aiyar revisits one of the most debated chapters of Rajiv Gandhi’s foreign policy: the handling of Sri Lanka’s civil war. The piece, titled “Intel Army Let Him Down,” argues that the Indian Army’s perceived inaction, rather than the policies of the former prime minister, played a pivotal role in the escalation of the conflict and in India’s strained diplomatic relations with Sri Lanka.

The Context: Rajiv Gandhi’s Sri Lanka Policy

Rajiv Gandhi’s tenure (1984‑1989) was marked by a significant shift in India’s approach to Sri Lanka. While earlier Indian administrations had been cautious, Gandhi adopted a more proactive stance, advocating for a negotiated settlement to the Tamil separatist movement led by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Aiyar’s article begins by outlining the diplomatic framework: the Gandhi government sought to balance non‑intervention with pressure on the Sri Lankan government to address Tamil grievances, hoping that a unified front could stabilize the island.

Aiyar points to Gandhi’s famous “two‑pronged approach”: firstly, diplomatic engagement with Sri Lankan leaders, and secondly, an emphasis on intelligence cooperation. He references a 1985 statement where Gandhi publicly condemned LTTE violence while urging the Sri Lankan government to grant concessions to Tamils. The policy, he argues, was designed to prevent a humanitarian disaster and to curb the spread of extremism in South Asia.

The Army’s Role and “Letting Him Down”

The crux of Aiyar’s argument is the assertion that the Indian Army, particularly the Intelligence Bureau, failed to provide timely and actionable intelligence on LTTE movements. According to the article, the Army’s lack of coordination with the Intelligence Bureau and the political leadership meant that Gandhi’s policy was based on incomplete information. Aiyar recounts a personal anecdote: during a covert operation, he received delayed intel that caused a missed opportunity to neutralize a key LTTE cell, a failure he attributes to systemic inefficiencies within the Army’s intelligence apparatus.

He further claims that the Army’s reluctance to act on Gandhi’s directives stemmed from political pressures and a lack of clear operational mandates. The piece suggests that the Army’s compliance with a “policy of restraint” led to the escalation of hostilities, ultimately culminating in the devastating 1987 Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) intervention. Aiyar frames this intervention as a tragic misstep, pointing out that it was launched under a misinformed assumption that it would quickly quell LTTE violence—an assumption that was, in part, based on the Army’s inadequate intelligence reports.

Counterarguments and Rebuttals

The article does not shy away from acknowledging criticisms of Rajiv Gandhi’s policy. Some scholars argue that Gandhi’s approach inadvertently empowered the LTTE by providing them with a platform to present their grievances. Aiyar counters that while the policy was imperfect, it was rooted in a desire to uphold India’s non‑interventionist ethos while simultaneously safeguarding its own strategic interests.

He further critiques the media’s portrayal of the IPKF’s failure, suggesting that journalists oversimplified the conflict by ignoring the complex dynamics between the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE, and the Indian state. Aiyar insists that the Army’s operational failure, not Gandhi’s vision, largely drove the IPKF’s ineffectiveness.

The Broader Implications for Indo‑Sri Lankan Relations

Aiyar’s narrative extends beyond a historical critique; he reflects on how the missteps of the 1980s have echoed into the present day. He highlights the lingering mistrust between India and Sri Lanka, noting that Indian diplomatic overtures have often been met with suspicion. He cites recent diplomatic incidents, such as Sri Lanka’s refusal to allow the construction of the Indian Peace Facility on the island, as evidence of a strained relationship.

In discussing future prospects, Aiyar advocates for a re‑establishment of a joint intelligence framework that can foster transparency and timely decision‑making. He calls for a reevaluation of the “two‑pronged” approach, suggesting that contemporary challenges—including terrorism, regional power dynamics, and humanitarian concerns—necessitate a more agile policy structure.

Additional Links and Context

Aiyar’s article also references a wealth of additional sources. Among them are:

• A 1985 speech by Rajiv Gandhi outlining his vision for a “United Sri Lanka” (link: https://www.india.gov.in/speeches/rajiv-gandhi-united-sri-lanka-1985).
• An investigative piece on the IPKF’s operational challenges (link: https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/india/ipkf-sunday-review-1987-operations/).
• A documentary on the evolution of India‑Sri Lanka diplomatic ties post‑1990 (link: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-54321001).

These references provide a layered understanding of the policy’s evolution, offering readers a chance to delve deeper into the geopolitical intricacies that shaped a nation’s foreign policy decisions.

Conclusion

“Intel Army Let Him Down” serves as both a historical reevaluation and a cautionary tale. Mani Shankar Aiyar’s defense of Rajiv Gandhi’s Sri Lanka policy underscores the pivotal role of intelligence and military coordination in foreign policy execution. By highlighting the Army’s shortcomings, the article not only seeks to rehabilitate Gandhi’s legacy but also to emphasize the necessity of robust, integrated intelligence frameworks for future diplomatic ventures. In a world where geopolitical landscapes shift rapidly, the lessons from the 1980s Indian‑Sri Lankan saga remain profoundly relevant.