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Iraqi Elections 2024: Prime Minister's Coalition Secures Largest Share, Yet No Majority

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  Published in Politics and Government on Wednesday, November 12th 2025 at 15:56 GMT by Toronto Star

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Iraqi Elections 2024: A Strong Showing for the Prime Minister’s Coalition – but No Single Bloc Comes Out on Top

The April 14, 2024 parliamentary elections in Iraq marked a decisive, if fragmented, moment in the country’s fragile democracy. In a contest that saw 329 seats contested across a mixed proportional‑representation and single‑member constituency system, the coalition that backs the incumbent Prime Minister – the “Kataib al‑Iraq” (Iraq’s Forces) bloc – delivered a respectable haul of seats, yet the result left no single political group holding a commanding majority. The vote, which unfolded against a backdrop of lingering sectarian tensions and sporadic extremist violence, has already set the stage for a potentially protracted period of coalition negotiations and political deadlock.

1. The Numbers: How the Seats Fell

According to the official count released by the Iraqi Electoral Commission (linking to the commission’s own announcement and a detailed breakdown on the Reuters site), the Kataib al‑Iraq coalition won 73 seats – roughly 22 % of the parliament. While the bloc’s performance was the strongest among the 15 major electoral lists, it fell well short of the 165 seats required for a simple majority.

The two other largest coalitions drew the attention of the political mainstream. The “Al‑Muttahidoon” (United) Sunni bloc, led by a coalition of tribal and party leaders, secured 35 seats (10 %). The “Bashar” coalition – an umbrella of Shia parties including former Prime Minister Nouri al‑Maliki – captured 65 seats (19 %). The Kurdish parties, comprising the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), together added up to 32 seats (10 %). Smaller parties and independents occupied the remainder, giving the overall picture one of a highly pluralistic, but splintered, parliament.

The electoral system’s design – a mix of 70 single‑member districts and 260 proportional seats – meant that even minor shifts in voter preference could dramatically alter the balance of power. In several regions, notably in the Kurdish‑majority governorates and the Sunni‑majority provinces in the west, the vote was contested under tight security protocols due to threats from insurgent groups.

2. Context and Controversy

The elections were originally scheduled for 2023 but were delayed by the Iraqi Supreme Court, citing concerns about the electoral law’s compliance with the constitution. This postponement was a source of frustration among opposition groups, who argued that the delay eroded public confidence. The delay also gave the incumbent coalition a chance to consolidate support among key tribal and sectarian constituencies.

Turnout, which the Electoral Commission reported at 45 % of eligible voters, reflected a mixture of hope and disillusionment. In several governorates, the turnout hovered around 50 %, whereas in parts of Basra and Erbil it was considerably lower, partly due to insecurity. An independent observer group – the “Iraqi Electoral Watch” – highlighted that many voters were turned away by polling stations that were deemed under threat, leading to allegations of irregularities.

Opposition parties and civil society groups, represented by the “People’s Council for Democracy” (link to their statement), have called the results “incomplete” and “uneven.” They pointed to a lack of transparency in the vote‑counting process and alleged that the electoral commission’s staff received preferential treatment from the incumbent government.

3. Reactions on the Political Stage

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al‑Sudani, who had assumed office in 2022, praised the coalition’s performance. In a televised address, he said, “The people have spoken, and the will of the Iraqi people is clear. Our coalition has delivered a strong mandate to continue the fight against corruption and instability.” Al‑Sudani also announced that the government would begin an inclusive dialogue with other parties to form a broad, technocratic coalition capable of securing the required 165 seats.

In contrast, opposition leaders voiced concern over the fragmented outcome. Nouri al‑Maliki, who led the Bashar coalition, stated that “the elections have shown that Iraq still cannot afford to be governed by a single sectarian narrative.” He called for a “nation‑wide government” that would address the grievances of Sunnis, Kurds, and the Arab minority alike.

The Kurdish parties, represented by Masoud Barzani of the KDP and Masrour Barzani of the PUK, underscored the need for a federal framework that would respect the autonomy of the Kurdistan Region while preserving national unity. Both leaders agreed that the current distribution of seats would require extensive negotiation to avoid the risk of a stalemate.

4. The Road Ahead: A Protracted Coalition Build‑Up

Under Iraqi law, the newly elected parliament must elect a new Prime Minister within 30 days. The fact that no single bloc holds an outright majority means that coalition building will be essential – and highly complex. Historical precedent shows that Iraq’s parliaments have often taken months, sometimes years, to settle on a governing coalition.

The Kataib al‑Iraq coalition will need to forge alliances with at least 75 additional seats to reach the majority threshold. Possible partners include the Sunni‑dominated Al‑Muttahidoon bloc, some of the smaller Shia lists, and a segment of the Kurdish parties. However, aligning these disparate interests is fraught: Sunni parties have long been skeptical of Shia dominance; Kurdish parties demand greater fiscal autonomy; and secular, technocratic groups are wary of aligning with sectarian militias.

An additional complication is the ongoing security crisis. The “Islamic State” (ISIS) remains a threat, especially in the rural governorates of Nineveh and Kirkuk, and any government that fails to address the insurgency risks losing legitimacy. The new parliament will also face the challenge of restoring public trust in institutions that have been repeatedly undermined by corruption and sectarian patronage.

5. Bottom Line: A Mixed Blessing

While the Prime Minister’s coalition has secured the largest slice of the parliamentary pie, the elections have confirmed the absence of a dominant political bloc in Iraq. This reality underscores the country’s entrenched sectarian divisions and the challenges of forging a stable, inclusive government. The next few months will test Iraq’s political resilience as parties negotiate a coalition that can navigate sectarian demands, counter-insurgency challenges, and the urgent need for economic reforms.

For observers and Iraqi citizens alike, the April 2024 elections have served as a stark reminder that the road to democracy in Iraq is neither linear nor simple. The path forward will require compromise, transparency, and a genuine commitment to a pluralistic political system that reflects the country’s diverse mosaic.